adminFred Fleitz’s warning that divisions inside Iran’s ruling class will make negotiations far more difficult is exactly the kind of clear-eyed analysis our policymakers need right now. The Iranian system is not a unified government bargaining in good faith; it is a messy, often violent coalition of clerical figures, a powerful Revolutionary Guard, and competing regional power brokers who answer to different centers of authority. When one faction talks compromise and another prepares for more conflict, any U.S. approach that assumes a single negotiating partner is doomed to fail.
Recent moves inside Iran — elevation of new power brokers and open tensions between civilian officials and IRGC hardliners — show the regime lurching between pragmatism and maximalism. That instability is not a negotiating advantage for the United States; it’s a danger that can be exploited by adversaries and easily used as cover by Iranian hawks to stall or sabotage genuine concessions. Fleitz and other experienced analysts are right to note that Tehran’s public diplomacy often masks internal fights that make enforceable deals nearly impossible.
The Islamabad talks and the ongoing dispute over the Strait of Hormuz illustrated the problem: Tehran will agree to rhetoric while leaving the operational levers in the hands of commanders who answer only to hardline elements. Any ceasefire or agreement that does not include verifiable, technical safeguards for the strait, inspections of nuclear facilities, and a clear mechanism to restrain proxy forces will be worthless. American negotiators must treat Iran’s words as theater and insist on enduring, verifiable changes on the ground.
The conservative case for pressure remains the clearest path to stability: sanctions, targeted strikes when necessary, and a credible military posture that raises the cost of bad-faith behavior. Appeasement or rushed deals born of optimism about fractured cliques will only empower the IRGC’s faction that benefits from chaos and conflict. Strength backed by resolve and oversight is the only language Tehran’s hardliners understand.
We should also face the grim fact that moderates inside Iran, those who might genuinely prefer normalization, are increasingly vulnerable to purges and intimidation. Negotiating with a polity where moderates can be sidelined or eliminated overnight is like signing a contract with a house of cards. Any American administration that overlooks this internal repression in pursuit of a photo-op deal will leave the region weaker and American interests exposed.
In short, the conservative position isn’t to reject diplomacy outright but to demand realism: no talks without leverage, no deals without enforceable verification, and no illusions about who actually calls the shots in Tehran. Fred Fleitz’s sober assessment should be a wake-up call — diplomacy must be backed by power and scrutiny, not blind faith in a fractured regime’s statements. The stakes are too high to do anything less.
