Staff Reports
The State Department dropped a 100‑page report this week that should make every American sit up. Titled “Cuba: The Capital of 21st Century Communism,” it lays out a long trail of Cuban espionage and, more immediately, warns that China is running signals‑intelligence (SIGINT) operations on the island aimed at the southeastern United States. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has pushed the report into the light. If you care about national security, this is not a drill.
China spy sites in Cuba: what the report actually says
The report says there are roughly 18 SIGINT installations on the island and that China “actively runs” three of them. Analysts have been pointing at places like Bejucal, Wajay, Calabazar and El Salao for months. Public satellite work has shown big antenna rings and a Circular Disposed Antenna Array (CDAA) at Bejucal — the kind of hardware you build when you want to listen from far away. The State Department says these sites can sweep up electronic traffic across the southeastern U.S., including military communications, ship movement and space‑launch telemetry. Independent analysts, notably at CSIS, back up the footprint data but rightly note that imagery alone can’t prove hands‑on control without classified confirmation.
Why this matters: national security and regional strategy
This isn’t a distant intelligence hobby. The southeast corridor is home to major bases, carrier routes and launch complexes. If a foreign power is listening from Cuban soil, our operations become easier to map and harder to conceal. Beijing’s growing ties with Havana — money, debt relief and infrastructure deals — are paying security dividends for China and strategic headaches for us. Add recent Chinese war‑game talk about Latin America, and the picture becomes clear: this is not benign investment. It’s a forward listening post aimed squarely at the United States.
What Washington should do next
First, Congress needs a full, classified briefing from the State Department, DNI and the Pentagon. Public satellite pictures are useful, but lawmakers must see the intelligence that underpins attribution. Second, we should harden our southeastern comms and space telemetry, and accelerate counter‑SIGINT measures. Third, tighten scrutiny on Chinese investments in Cuba and the region, and be ready to sanction any Moscow‑ or Beijing‑linked projects that threaten U.S. security. Finally, treat Cuban propaganda and campus influence operations for what they are: coordinated attempts to weaken American institutions. This requires bipartisan action, not partisan hand‑wringing.
Call it what it is: a Cuban‑Chinese partnership that buys influence with cash and spies with antennas. Secretary Rubio deserves credit for dragging this into the open. Now the rest of Washington needs to stop clapping and start acting. If we ignore a foreign power listening in from 90 miles away, don’t be surprised when the next surprise is painfully predictable.
