Staff Reports
A new analysis has pulled back the curtain on a very expensive influence campaign in Washington. Investigative reporter Brody Mullins used FARA filings and OpenSecrets tallies to show that South Korea and state‑linked entities have spent about $363 million lobbying in the United States over the past decade. For a country that likes to lecture about fairness, that’s a lot of money thrown at the very lawmakers who are supposed to hold both sides to the rules.
What the new report reveals
The Mullins analysis, based on OpenSecrets’ Foreign Lobby Watch totals and FARA filings, finds roughly $363.2 million in cumulative lobbying spending for South Korea (2016–2025). State entities — including KOTRA, the Korea Tourism Organization, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, and the Korean embassy — account for more than $236 million of that total. That means government money, not private charities or tourist boards, is being used to buy access in Washington.
Who’s paying and who’s getting paid
The filings show Seoul retained about 29 Washington firms and more than 180 registered foreign agents. Big names include Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, BGR Group, Akin Gump, Mercury Public Affairs, and Squire Patton Boggs. KOTRA alone shows up as a major spender — roughly $85 million in the filings — while the tourism agency and other state groups show tens of millions more. Yet even at these prices, the work doesn’t always seem to buy results: one report points out Mercury collected a $120,000 retainer for a six‑month period that included zero documented contacts in that filing window.
Why this matters — access without results
This is not just a story about big numbers. It hits a nerve because American firms have complained about unfair treatment in South Korea — most famously the Coupang data‑breach fallout that drew the ire of members of Congress. Senator Mike Lee has called Seoul’s actions “unprecedented persecution” of an American company. Meanwhile, Korean officials appear to underreport their lobbying to domestic audiences — the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy told Koreans it spent about $3.4 million, while FARA filings suggest closer to $5.4 million. Transparency? Not exactly.
Conclusion: time for tougher scrutiny
Money can buy access; it can buy fancy breakfasts and phone calls with former staffers. But it can’t buy trust, and it can’t erase the awkward fact that U.S. lawmakers are being courted by a government that treats American companies poorly at home. Congress should take the Mullins findings seriously and ask hard questions: who is being influenced, what are the concrete results, and why are taxpayers and private firms getting the short end of the stick? If nothing else, this episode proves a blunt point: influence spending should be transparent, and allies should not use Washington as their repair shop when their own rules create international problems.
